‘Suspected influence operation’ ran online prior to general election, study finds

A study has brought into the spotlight a “suspected coordinated influence operation” that took place prior to the 2026 General Election, with AI “slopaganda” being used.

The Mediterranean Digital Media Observatory (MedDMO), a regional hub of the European Digital Media Observatory covering Greece, Cyprus and Malta published the study.

It is a consortium that provides new avenues for collaborative fact checking by focusing on emerging disinformation campaigns relevant specifically to the Mediterranean territory.

It found that just before and after Prime Minister Robert Abela called Malta’s 2026 general election, “a number of dubious domains were registered, all leading to websites that were decidedly biased towards the governing Labour Party.”

It said that social media accounts and pages “with evidence of troll farming” were also set up, some directly associated with the sites.

Among other things, it found that Facebook pages contained bots or fake accounts, and that the locations of the people who managed them were almost exclusively from other countries.

The study could not state who was responsible for the campaign or what their motive was, but said that the content was "well-versed in the local sociopolitical context, and it knew how to target its audience."

MedDMO said that the operation was seemingly not aimed at misleading the audience with facts, but rather that evidence points to the operation’s goal being to “galvanise political support through demagoguery, by stirring up the audience’s base instincts and fostering division.”

It identified a number of activities that were suggestive of a “coordinated digital effort to distort public opinion ahead of the vote."

"The most notable and evident case was that of the dubious domains and the related social media accounts, which constituted a suspected influence operation,” MedDMO said.

It noted that, according to the Nationalist Party, swarming tactics were used against the Net News Facebook page, where a “wave of reports to the social media platform” resulted with the page being removed in early May. The page was later restored when the political party got in touch with Meta.

Secondly, it noted that AI slopaganda was used to distort debate, “and it noticeably targeted the opposition Nationalist Party more than the Labour Party. Slopaganda refers to content that does not necessarily aim to mislead on factual grounds, but rather is intended to influence people’s views and opinions.”

These kinds of images create associations that stick; they strike right at emotions, making them an effective tactic for propagating narratives, since people generally remember feelings more than facts, the report reads.

It noted that “slopaganda” against the PN targeted candidates, while conversely “content targeting the governing Labour Party concerned the party’s reputation and actions more generally, as well as its election slogan. There was also significantly more slopaganda targeting the opposition party.”

The study found 5 “dubious domains” which were set up prior to or right after the election was called. It mentioned them by name: goodmorningmalta.com – registered on 19th March 2026 (seemingly suspended around mid-June); pnmalta.com – registered on 9th April 2026; appostli.com – registered on 13th April 2026 (seemingly suspended around mid-June); factcheckmalta.com – registered on 22nd April 2026 (“under construction”); alexgaffes.com – registered on 7th May 2026.

Prime Minister Abela called the election on 27^th April.

MedDMO said that the operation was decidedly biased towards the Labour Party, praising its successes while criticising the PN.

The study analysed the pages. For instance, regarding the Appostli Facebook page, MedDMO said it openly promoted Labour Party proposals, using the party’s own campaign material and faces in reels it posted. It found that the writing style indicated AI use, but the content was well-versed in the local political context, thus indicating that a person or group was involved.

The study found that sites attempted to appear as genuine news sites while spreading disinformation. “They frequently reworked or republished content from actual local news sites, such as the Times of Malta, backdating it years to give it a sense of legitimacy.”

It said that this kind of content was mixed in with articles that appeared to be of the sites’ own making. “Such articles typically resembled AI slop, as they strung together elements (including false claims) incoherently. However, they appeared to have a clear sense of what kind of claims are likely to attract clicks, again evident of local knowledge."

One example of such content, it said, "was an article on appostli.com entitled ‘Leaked docs reveal foreign funding behind Daphne Foundation agenda’. The article was completely unrelated to its title.”

The study found elements of coordination between the sites, for instance mentioning that appostli.com published an article about the browser game on alexgaffes.com the same day that the latter domain was registered.

Regarding three Facebook pages – Appostli, Good Morning Malta and Diary of Ġahan – the study found that these Facebook pages were created years back under different names, only changing to their new names just before the election was called. Only in one case was Malta listed as the location of a person who managed a page.

In contrast to this, the Instagram accounts of Appostli and Diary of Ġahan were based in Malta, and were created in April 2026.

It said that the Facebook pages had several thousand followers, but that most were fake accounts. “A post by one of these pages, particularly by Appostli, could attract hundreds of reactions within minutes, which is a bit unusual for Malta. On inspection, the accounts engaging with the posts were bot or fake accounts.”

This, it said, is a clear indication of manufactured engagement to manipulate public discourse.

It did say that some posts by the Appostli Facebook page did actually attract a large number of real profiles, noting that this happened when posts were shared by pro-PL Facebook groups.

The study also found that the three Facebook pages had also run adverts or sponsored posts on social media. “The majority of adverts published by these pages name different payers and advertisers. These are ‘SUPPLY4INDUSTRY LTD’, ‘Economia’, ‘OKONG Corporation’, and ‘DX Care’.” One of these companies is described as an “international industrial supply company and independent distributor,” and another as an accounting and financial management company in Denmark. “In all four cases, it is unclear whether these are the same “bodies” that are listed on the aforementioned Meta adverts, or if such “bodies” were even involved; further investigation would be needed to determine this.”

In its conclusions, the report said that the operation was evidently geared towards influencing its audience’s perception by targeting their base emotions rather than their rational judgement.

“The case indeed opens up several questions, including who was paying for the social media accounts’ sponsored content, why they were doing so, and who was benefiting from it. Most pressing of all, though, is this: who was ultimately behind the influence operation?”